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Savingsand the
Foreign Trade Regime
Inanalyzing the impact of India's overall economic policies on the domestic
savings effort, we will argue that:
1. there is little evidence that the marginal propensity to save in the
Indian economy was significantly different between the 1950s, when the
severity of exchange control (on the average) was less, and the 1960s, when
it was more;
2. detailed analysis does not support the hypothesis that India's absorp-
tion of foreign aid has adversely affected her savings effort; this is a conclusion
of interest, not merely because of widespread concern with this problem in
LDCs today, but because the 1966 economic policy changes toward "liberali-
zation" were partly motivated by the desire to continue aid flow from the
consortium members who had virtually made these policy changes a precondi-
tion for continuation of aid;
3. there is no evidence that the more recent, import-substituting indus-
tries which have grown up primarily during the years 1956—70 under the
economic regime we have been describing are significantly higher savers than
the more traditional industries; and
4. we do not have adequate data to test the further hypothesis that
"organized" industry in tow is a better saver than "agriculture." Thus we
cannot argue convincingly that the exchange control regime, which buttressed
the increasing industrialization, led to greater saving; nor can we establish any
other strong links between savings and the Indian foreign trade regime although
we consider several possibilities.
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DOMESTIC SAVINGS AND
STRINGENCY OF QRs
It is well known that the data on which Indian national income estimates are
based are inadequate and even the methodology of computation is not neces-
sarily the best that could be adopted given the data. The situation regarding
savings and investment estimates is even worse: there are no "direct" estimates
for either. In brief, aggregate investment is estimated as the value of goods
and services used in investment activity. Savings estimates are obtained as a
residual from investment estimates by subtracting therefrom the estimated
external capital inflow. This is not to suggest that direct estimates are not
available for some components of savings and investment—indeed, relatively
accurate direct estimates are available relating to the savings and investment
activities of the public sector as well as the large-scale manufacturing sector.
But a large proportion has still to be estimated indirectly.'
Given the nature of the data, therefore, it was decided not to attempt to
build an elaborate simultaneous-equation model of the Indian economy but
rather to work with single-equation regressiOn relationships. The idea is not
so much to estimate the marginal propensity to save with great accuracy as
rather to obtain some useful insights into overall savings behavior.
Let us begin, therefore, with the simplest possible relationship:
Stao+aiYt+ut (16—1)
where St stands for aggregate savings, Yt for national income and Ut for a
random disturbance term, all variables relating to year t.
In estimating equation (16—1), we had a choice in defining savings and
income (1) in either gross or net terms, (2) at either nominal or real value,
and (3) in either per capita or aggregate terms. Since the basis on which
replacement of capital expenditures is estimated is extremely weak, we decided
to define the variables in gross rather than net terms. Again, we decided to
concentrate on the relationship between real magnitudes, though in a more
elaborate model the impact of monetary factors should be brought in. Finally,
to a limited extent we experimented with both alternatives in (3).
The period of our analysis was 195 1—52 to 1969—70. There is a belief
among some Indian economists that the period since 1965—66 is radically
different from the period before, both politically and economically: politically,
because the system was exposed to the deaths of Prime Ministers Nehru and
Shastri in quick succession in 1964 and 1966; economically, because of (1)
the two successive droughts of unprecedented magnitude in 1965 and 1966,
(2) aid stoppage during the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965, its resumption in230 GROWTHEFFECTS
1966and subsequent scaling down and (3) the devaluation and liberalization
of June 1966. Since we have data only for a four-year period since 1966, we
cannot adequately test this belief. However, we do estimate the relationships
separately for the entire period and for the period 1951—52 to 1965—66 to see
whether there is any sharp break in the income-savings relationship.
From the point of view of the present monograph, perhaps an equally
relevant division of the period would be 1951—52 to 1959—60 and 1960—6 1 to
1969—70 since the exchange control regime was more stringent on the average
through the 1960s (the liberalization associated with devaluation being short-
lived, as we have seen already). We thus examine the issue whether any
significant change in savings behavior can be observed between the decade of
the 1950s and that of the 1960s.
For converting nominal investment to real terms, we had two alternative
investment deflators available (denoted by subscripts 1 and 2): one developed
by the Perspective Planning Division (PPD) of the Planning Commission and
the other put out by the Central Statistical Organisation (CSO). Since savings
were obtained as a residual from investment by subtracting the external re-
source flow (i.e., the current account surplus or deficit), we had a number of
alternative ways of obtaining real savings, of which the following (denoted by
superscripts I and II) were used:
I: Deflate merchandise imports and exports by their respective unit value
indices and take the surplus or deficit on non-merchandise account without
deflation.
II: Deflate the entire current account surplus or deficit by the unit value
index of imports, the idea being that, in this way, we capture the real import
potential of nominal resource inflow.
Thus, we had four alternative definitions of real savings, S11(t),
S111(t) and where, for instance, S111(t) represents the real savings in
year tobtainedby subtracting from real investment (defined as the nominal
investment deflated by the PPD deflator) the real external resource flow ob-
tained by using procedure II described above. The per capita variables are
denoted by the same symbols, but in lower case: e.g., s,y,etc.
The results of our regressions are reported in Tables 16—1 and 16_2.2
The fit as measured by R2 is quite good in all the regressions. It appears that
the estimate of the marginal propensity to save is not very sensitive to the
choice of deflators or of the procedure by which the real external resource
flow was calculated, though some sensitivity is seen in the period 1960—6 1 to
1969—70. As is to be expected (given that population, income and savings
were rising over time), the marginal propensity to save in each regression in-
volving per capita variables is higher than in the corresponding regression with
aggregate variables. The goodness of fit of the per capita relationship is, how-
ever, somewhat poorer.
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Let us now examine the results in Tables 16—1 and 16—2 for inter-period
comparisons of the marginal propensity to save. Clearly, there seems to be
little evidence for the view that either the post-1966 liberalization years sig-
nificantiy changed the marginal propensity to save from the preceding period
TABLE 16-1
Savings Regressions,
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to 1959—60 and 1960—61 to 1969—70
1951—52 to1959—60 1960—61 to1969—70
1.Si' =—815+ 0.18 Y = 0.73 —592 + 0.18 Y =0,73
(520)(0.04) (698)(0.04)
2.S2' =—1087+ 0.21 Y R2 =0.72—1271 + 0.22 Y =0.87
(607)(0.05) (560)(0.03)
3.S11' =—532+ 0.16 Y R' =0.63 —834 + 0.19 Y =0.80
(563)(0.05) (610)(0.03)
4. —804 + 0.18Y 0.67—1514 + 0.24Y 0.91
(600)(0.05) (741)(0.03)
NOTE: Figures in parentheses
of the regressions.
are standard errors. Refer to the text for explanation232 GROWTHEFFECTS
(Table16—i )3or the1960s period of relatively tighter exchange situation
was characterized by a higher marginal propensity to save than the somewhat
less stringent period of the 1950s (Table 16—2)
DOMESTICSAVINGS AND EXTERNAL
RESOURCES
We have postulated so far that savings are a function of income alone. How-
ever, it has been argued recently that savings are a function of domestic ex-
penditure, rather than income, so that we should instead write:
(16—2)
whereis the foreign capital inflow, defined as the negative of the balance
on current account andis domestic consumption. We therefore estimated
the following equation as well:
=ao +aiYt + a2Ft+Ut (16—2a)
Clearly, when a1= (a2 +1), this equation will correspond to equation (16—2).
A positive (negative) value forwouldbe consistent with the hypothesis
that external resources complement (substitute for) domestic resources.
The following version of (1 6—2a), withlagged by one year, was also
estimated:
= ao+ajYt + a2Ft_i + Ut (16—2b)
The idea underlying equation (1 6—2b) is that if indeed consumption is related
to expected volume of resources available, then it may be reasonable to pre-
sume that such expectations for any year are formed on the basis of the actual
resources in the previous year. This would suggest thatshould be related
to Y, and Ye_iisvery high
(while that between and F1......1is not) the relation (16—2b) would, how-
ever, do just as well as one with instead of
The results for both (1 6—2a) and (1 6—2b) are shown in Table 16—3.
Only the results relating to the PPD deflator and the second procedure for
calculating the real resource flow are reported here. We find that when used in
conjunction with income, the explanatory power of contemporaneous external
resource flow in explaining savings is virtually nil: the coefficients on F are
statistically insignificantly different from zero. The lagged response equations
also perform badly: with one exception, the coefficients on F1 are also not
significantly different from zero. Thus we infer that domestic savings do not
seem to be influenced by external resources.
On the other hand, a mild skepticism toward this conclusion may be in
order. For one thing, the introduction of F1 generally seems to lead toSAVINGS AND THE FOREIGN TRADE REGIME 233
TABLE 16-3
Savings Regressions









(a)S1H = + 0.16Y
(747)(0.06)






















NOTE: Figures in parentheses are standard errors.
*Thecoefficient on F_1 is significantly different from zero at 5 percent
coefficients on F_1 are not significantly different from zero, in this table.
level; other
higher (not lower) coefficients on Y than, for comparable periods, in Tables
16—1 and 16—2. In contrast, a different test suggests an opposite inference:
I.e., that domestic savings are a function of (Y + F) rather than (Y). Thus,







so that we have the relationship that the coefficient on Y is equal to one plus
the coefficient on F (or F_..1, if we put in lagged response). We can therefore
test whether the coefficients on Y are indeed significantly different from one
plus the coefficients on F and F_1 in Table 16—3. This test indicates that the
hypothesis of equation (16—2) is not rejected by the data in Table 16—3:
thus we cannot rule out altogether the possibility that external resources sub-
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On balance, therefore, we would conclude that there is not enough evi-
dence, and at best the evidence conflicts, to say whether the absorption of
external resources has adversely affected India's domestic savings effort.
Note also that, in regard to our earlier conclusions in this chapter, the
introduction of F or F_1 into the estimating equation does not significantly
affect the conclusions reached (via inter-period analysis) regarding the impact
of the severity of exchange control on the savings effort.
Sectoral Impact.
We may next examine the possibility that, even if the overall impact of
the external resource inflow on domestic savings is negligible, the impact on
certain components thereof may be rather large.
From this viewpoint, itis relevant to distinguish between public and
private savings, relating the former to public revenues and the latter to private
income alone. Since private income as well as public revenues (to a smaller
extent) were in turn correlated with Y, we used Y as the explanatory variable
in addition to the external resource flow to reestimate the equations separately
for private and government savings. The results are set out in Table 16—4, for
the period 1951—52 to 1965—66.
As in the case of total savings, the explanatory power of contemporaneous
capital inflow is nil in explaining either public or private savings. The lagged
capital inflow, however, has a significant negative coefficient in the case of
TABLE 16-4
Privateand Government
Savings Regressions, 1951—52 to 1965—66
=—1135+ 0.19Y —0.28F R2 =0.91
(304)(0.03)(0.36)
=—1433+ 0.22Y —0.77F-1R2 =0.94
(245)(0.02)(0.28)
=—476 +0.06Y —0.1OF R2 =0.84
(158)(0.01)(0.19)
Sic11 = 543+ 0.06Y —0.O1F-tR2 =0.84
(160)(0.01)(0.18)
NOTES: Figuresin parentheses are standard
errors.
The subscripts p and g denote respectively pri-
vate and public savings. Refer to the text for ex-
planation of the regressions.SAVINGS AND THE FOREIGN TRADE REGIME 235
privatesavings but the marginal propensity to save in i:he lagged relationship
is higher than that in the unlagged one. These results, however, are difficult to
interpret, as we would normally have expected the external resource inflow to
work primarily through the budget—in view of the larger component of foreign
aid—by reducing public savings: the significance of 'the lagged foreign re-
source inflow in influencing private savings seems to us therefore to be mainly
spurious
Thuswe conclude that our analysis contradicts the thesis that incoming
foreign resources have seriously interfered with the domestic savings effort.
This is probably not surprising since the planning mechanism has, by and
krge, served to make the domestic tax-and-savings effort keep in step with the
aid flow, both because of internal clarity on this objecl;ive and external (aid-
donor-induced) pressure-cum-ethos in this regard.6
RETAINED EARNINGS BY SPECIFIC
INDUSTRIES IN THE CORPORATE SECTOR
The manufacturing sector as a whole accounted for less than 14 percent of
national income in 1969—70. The contribution of registered factories was
around 8 percent. The non-financial private corporate sector which is included
in the group of registered factories and is its predominant part is estimated to
have contributed about 5 percent of total domestic savings in 1971—72. Thus
this sector is not a major source of savings in the Indian economy. However,
since the exchange control regime had a major impact on this sector, it may
nevertheless be of some interest to see whether the industries favored by the
import substitution policies were relatively higher savers.
The Reserve Bank of India publishes financial data relating to large
public and private limited companies. The private limited companies account
only for about 10 percent of total assets of this group. Since this is a relatively
small group, we decided to confine our attention to the public limited com-
panies. A number of alternative relationships between retained earnings (RE)





(N is net worth)
RE p /PAT\
(16—3c)236 GROWTH EFFECTS
The relationship (16—3a) is straightforward and needs no explanation.
The relationship (16—3b) was suggested by the fact that the Reserve Bank
publishes only pooled data relating to the companies operating in different
sectors of the economy and not individual company data. Since the number of
companies in each sector has changed over time, itis possible that some
heteroscedasticity may be present in equation •(16—3a).Equation (16.—3b),
with a =0,would then correspond to (16—3a) with correction for hetero-
scedasticity if one assumed that the residual variance in (16—3a) was propor-
tional to the square of net worth. Similarly, equation (l6—3c), with a =0,
would be the correct estimating equation if the residual variance in (16—3a)
was proportional to net worth. Note, however, that the coefficient a in the
equations estimated was not specified to be zero so that the data could de-
termine whether it indeed was significantly different from zero. Also, note that
a positive (negative) a (in 16—3b or 16—3c) will imply that for any given
level of profits after tax, retained earnings will be higher (lower) the larger
the net worth.
The regression results relating to 10 industries, for the years 1950—5 8
and 1960—61 to 1968—69, are given in Table 16—5.
The first four industries in Table 16—5 are, by and large, long-established
and "traditional" industries; the first two are also major exporters and none
can be considered to have been "helped" by the foreign trade regime. Indus-
tries 5 to 10 did certainly "benefit" from such controls, however. If we now
look at the results obtained by estimating equation (16—3a), we find that
while two out of four "traditional" industries had marginal propensities to
save exceeding 0.50, the corresponding figure is four out of six in the case
of the remaining industries. The correction for heteroscedasticity [equations
(16—3b) or (16—3c)] improves the goodness of fit and equation (16—3c)
seems to yield a better fit to a certain extent in almost all cases though, in
none of the cases is the increase in R2 very large.
Confining our attention to estimated equation (16—3c), in Table 16—5,
we find that, keeping net worth constant, an increase of a unit in profits after
taxes will increase retained earnings by more than 0.75 units in all cases
except jute, for which the figure is 0.74. Thus, our analysis suggests that all 10
industries considered were good savers.
In order to examine rigorously, however, whether the "non-traditional"
industries are (on the average) better savers than "traditional" industries, we
ran a number of statistical tests. These tests were performed as follows. We
estimated a common marginal propensity to save [i.e.,/3 of (16—3a), yof
(1 6—3b) and (1 6—3c) Jforthe two groups of industries while allowing the
other parameters to vary among industries, using an appropriate (slope)
dummy variable technique. It turned out that the coefficient of this dummy
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































tingto "traditional" industries and the value of PAT for (16—3a), PAT/N for
(16—3b) and PAT/V'N for (16—3c) corresponding to each observation re-
lating to "non-traditional" industries] was negative in each case [i.e.,for
(16—3a), (16—3b) and (16—3c)], suggesting that "non-traditional" industries
on the average had a lower, not higher, marginal propensity to save! However,
the t values of these coefficients turned out to be insignificant so that the aver-
age MPS of "non-traditional" industries is not significantly different (at 1 per-
cent level) from that of "traditional" industries, except in the case of equation
(16—3a).7
After comparing the average MPS of the two groups of industries, we
also examined whether there is any significant difference between the MPS of
industries within each group. This is done through an analysis-of-variance test
which compares the increase (after dividing by the appropriate degrees of
freedom) in the residual sum of squares brought about by estimating a com-
mon slope for the group in relation to the sum of the residual sum of squares
of the industries in the group when a separate regression is estimated for each
industry. It turned out that the MPS of the "non-traditional" industries did
nOt differ significantly (in a statistical sense) regardless of the form of the
relationship (16—3a, 16—3b, or 16—c) estimated; the "traditional" industries
had, however, significantly different MPS (at 1 percent level) except in the
case of equation (16—3a).8
We must conclude therefore that it is not possible to argue, on the basis of
the available and analyzed evidence, that any systematic differences in the
marginal propensity to save can be discerned in different industries, or in
"traditional" as against "non-traditional" industries. In fact, the only signifi-
cant differences within any group of industries that are observed belong to the
limited group of "traditional" industries, something that yields no comfort to
those who look to the efficacy of the trade regime in raising savings as an
offsetting argument against those who convincingly demonstrate its inefficien-
cies in other respects.
OTHER LINKS WITH SAVINGS
The previous section suggests that, in terms of both the average and the margi-
nal propensity to save, the corporate sector is perhaps the best s?ver. Hence,
if the regime led to "additional" industrialization which, in turn, expanded the
corporate sector, this could have contributed to greater saving.
In turn, if the result was also an expansion of urban incomes, we have
the additional evidence, however slight, that urban households have a higher
marginal propensity to save than rural households. The National Council for
Applied Economic Research conducted two household savings surveys, theSAVINGS AND THE FOREIGN TRADE REGJ:ME 239
first in 1960 covering urban households, and the second in 1962 covering rural
households.° The Council has also conducted anothei' survey in the early
1970s, the results of which are yet to be published. The earlier surveys, how-
ever, showed that the marginal propensity to save (MPS), net of rural house-
holds, was 0.168 when savings in the form of currency, consumer durables
and livestock were included, and 0.145 if these were excluded. The MPS of
urban households was higher, at 0.34, coming down to 0.24 if the top and
bottom 10 percent of income groups are excluded on assumption that their
incomes are affected by transitory factors, influencing excessively the esti-
mated MPS.'°
We may finally note that the urban sector is also a better saver, not
merely because of the corporate sector and the urban households, but also
because the government's tax net is more effective in the urban than in the
rural sector (to a point where agricultural income has escaped with virtually
no taxation so far). On the other hand, one may also argue that the inability
to raise enough savings from the urban sector could well have prompted
greater efforts in the direction of agricultural taxation; alternatively, a rapidly
growing agricultural sector, as seems now likely in the post-Green-Revolution
period, could well have led to a better perception of the need to tax this sector
and hence perhaps to greater action in that regard." We also need to note
finally that higher savings rates may still imply lower growth rates if the in-
vestment needed to sustain unit growth of income increases sufficiently in the
process owing to inefficiencies or misallocation of resources. In particular, in
relation to the urban expansion, note that such an outcome of the economic
policies, even if it leads to an increase in the savings rate, may well require
additional investments in high capital-output ratio activities such as housing
and related infrastructure in the cities and thus slow down economic growth
on that account.
The frequent argument that a OR-regime enables the government to get
away' with inflation and thereby encourages inflationary policies that combine
with low nominal interest rates and declining real interest rates to cause a
reduction in savings does not seem relevant to India which, until 1962—63,
had experienced only a moderate trend increase in prices. The post-1966
situation in particular has had less price stability, but the period is too short
and disturbed in the end by the refugee crisis of 1972 and the emergence of
Bangladesh and its associated strains on the Indian economy to make any
reasonable evaluation of this hypothesis possible at the time this monograph
was 'written. Needless to say, however, there is nothing about a OR-regime
which requires that real interest rates be kept excessively low.
We may next note the argument that India's development strategy erred
in permitting a skewed income distribution which resulted in an unnecessarily
import-intensive consumption pattern that increased the foreign exchange con-240 GROWTH EFFECTS
straint and reduced the feasible rate of savings and growth.'2 Admittedly,
there is a grain of truth in this; but it may well be contended that this argument
is a critique of inefficient and unjust income-distribution policies, rather than of
the OR-and-industrial-licensing regime. But there is a connection. It was really
the growth of consumer industries, often at a very low economic scale but
nevertheless supported by the QR-regime and automatically protected, that
enabled the government to claim that luxury imports were down while per-
mitting and encouraging the consumption of similar domestically produced
luxury items in the name of industrialization. An economic policy that would
have forbidden the indiscriminate growth of such consumer and allied indus-
tries domestically would have made the cost of permitting such luxury con-
sumption much more obvious by making it feasible only through importation
in many cases. This might well have resulted in greater political pressure to
pursue income redistribution more energetically. Of course, a socialist cynic
might well argue that the result would have been merely to seek other subter-.
fuges to avoid making the genuine left-wing shift implicit in a redistributive
program with a real bite.
Finally, we must note the rents which accrued to those who were given
access to the scarce imports carrying large premia through the bulk of the
period we have been studying. This implies that an alternative regime, under
which these premia had been siphoned off into the tax net, would have been
productive of more savings. If we allow for an average premium of 40 percent
on imports, and assume an average import bill of Rs. 18 billions (which is the
approximate average for the import bill for the first four years of the Third
Plan) and assume, in turn, that half of this could have been subject to this
premium-siphoning exercise, we would have had an annual tax revenue collec-
tion of Rs. 3.5 billions on this account alone, representing nearly 10 percent
of the tax revenue in India during 1969—70 of Rs. 39.9 bilEions. Thus, even if
nothing else had been changed in the Indian economic regime, a shift to an
exchange rate regime which eliminated this premium, by devaluation or by the
use of adjustable tariffs or exchange auctions suitably designed, would have
helped generate greater savings.
Needless to say, all the increase in taxation would not have implied a
corresponding increase in savings in the economy. While we think that it is
reasonable to assume that increased government savings would have more
than offset the loss in savings from those deprived of the import premia, we
must admit also that the resulting increment in total savings is likely to have
been rather small. This is because most of the imports went to the corporate
manufacturing sector as the AU import licensing became more important, and
the profits of that sector were subject to the 50 percent corporation tax any-
way,'3 and, as we have already seen, the corporate sector has a rather large
propensity to save out of incremental retained earnings.
In conclusion, we can only say that the linkages between India's tradeSAVINGS AND THE FOREIGN TRADE REGIME 241
regime and her savings performance are many and diverse; they are also diffi-
cult to evaluate and quantify with the degree of success that would be neces-
sary to arrive at a reasonably firm conclusion regarding the sign of the net
impact. It is clear enough, on balance, at the end of our analysis that one
cannotreallyjustify, on the available and analyzed evidence, any claim that
the OR-regime, while it may have led to several static inefficiencies and costs,
had at least the saving grace to improve the savings performance and thus
lead to higher growth in the long run.
NOTES
[. More can be learned about this subject from C. R. Rao, ed., Data Base of the
indian Economy (Calcutta: Statistical Publishing Society, 1972).
2. The statistical results reported in Tables 16—1 through 16—4 have been taken
from T. N. Srinivasan, S. D. Tendulkar and A. Vaidyanathan, A Study of the Aggregate
Savings Behaviour of the Indian Economy (New Delhi: Indian StatisticalInstitute,
;973),
3. Recall, however, our caveats in the preceding discussion about the lack of
sufficient data for the post-1966 period to test this hypothesis effectively. Table 16—1 is
only a weak way of learning about this issue.
4. Note again that the early half of the 1950s was very comfortable but the last.
two years of the decade were already characteriied by the strict QR-regime, as pointed
out in Chapter 2. Note also that if the marginal propensity to save tends to rise with
increasing per capita income, its failure to do so in the 1960s may be significant as a
possible shortcoming of the QR-regime.
5. In fact, we might as well argue that the resource inflow could have improved
investment opportunities—in India, the inflow of private foreign investment leads to the
same result since joint ventures are actively promoted by government—and could have
led to increased private savings alaHirschman to utilize these opportunities! The only
"weak" argument in support of the negative coefficient on is that consumption isa.
function of available imports which, in turn, reflect foreign aid inflow. This argument;
would be justified to some extent by PL480 imports.
5. For relevant details on the tax efforts of the Indian government from 1950 to
966. see Bhagwati and Desai, India, pp. 7 1—73.
'7. The I values were:




8. The F values were:
Traditional Non-traditional
Degrees of Degrees of
Form of the Equation Freedom F Freedom F
16—3a 3,64 1.57 5,96 2.18
16—3b 3,60 5,92 5,90 2.26
16—3c 3,60 7.74 5,90 0.32242 GROWTHEFFECTS
9. The methodology, the sampling design and the detailed results of these two
surveys were published in a series of studies by the government of India, New Delhi:
Urban Income and Saving appeared in 1962 and the Al! India Rural Household Survey
was brought out in three volumes in 1964, 1965 and 1966.
10. The Reserve Bank of India used to publish time series data (discontinued after
1963) on aggregate savings of rural households based on an extrapolation of the bench-
mark estimates obtained for 1951—52 in its rural credit survey. Since the methodology of
extrapolation is subject to criticism (see the chapter by A. Rudra on savings estimates in
Rao, Data Base), and since data for the years beyond 1962—63 are not available, we do
not report the RBI results here. Some fragmentary evidence relating to household
savings in some regions of India is also available. See P. G. K. Panikkar, Rural Savings
in India (Bombay: Somaiya Publications, 1970).
11. At the height of the tax effort in relation to national income in 1965—66, the
shares of the public sector and the private corporate sector in net domestic savings were
estimated at 22.9 and 4.2 percent. In the preceding year, when there was no drought and
therefore no need to subsidize food primarily, these shares were 29.3 and 5.2 percent.
See Fourth Plan Mid-Term Appraisal, Vol. I,1971, Government of India, Planning
Commission, New Delhi.
12. The Approach to the Fifth Five Year Plan, Government of India, Planning
Commission, New Delhi, claims to demonstrate this point by contrasting the results of a
planning-model exercise with two different consumption vectors, one in which income is
redistributed to the bottom 30 percent and one in which it is not. The emerging plan,
therefore, is likely to opt for the former course on grounds of both growth and redistribu-
tive justice. We should note, however, that the alleged contrast between the two variants
depends on assumptions about feasible growth rates in agriculture. In case of feasibility
constraints on agricultural growth, the redistribution variant could well require the
importation of so much food as to reverse the growth ranking of the two variants!
13. However, note also that whenever these premia were "cashed" in the market by
illegal transactions, they escaped the tax net. In contributing to the large amount of
"black" money in circulation, the exchange control regime, which made the transfer of
AU licenses illegal but not infrequent, was itself a major force in making the tax effort
of the Indian fiscal authorities less effective than it might have been.